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Motivated reasoning occurs when judgements subserve
motives that go beyond accuracy seeking. Substantial
evidence indicates that motivated political reasoning is
ubiquitous. This is hard to reconcile with computational
theories (following Marr's terminology, theories
describing the fundamental principles underlying a
cognitive process) like Bayesian inference, because
these rely on accuracy maximization. Hence, motivated
political reasoning is often interpreted as violating
computational principles. Here we propose a different
view by offering a computational account of motivated
political reasoning which relies on the notion of
Bayesian decision (instead of Bayesian inference). The
key idea is that utility maximization, and not accuracy
maximization, drives political thinking. This implies
that agents will tend to endorse judgements that serve
their instrumental goals even when evidence in support
is poor (though agents will still believe their judgements
are the most accurate). In this framework, motivated
political reasoning is not interpreted as violating
computational principles, although its nature is now
conceived as pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals)
rather than epistemic (i.e., seeking understanding). The
paper presents a mathematical description of the theory
and shows how this can help interpreting important
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phenomena in political psychology such contextual
priming, stereotyping, and displaced aggression.
KEYWORD S
Bayesian, computational, displaced aggression, motivated
reasoning, political reasoning, stereotype
1 | INTRODUCTION
In political psychology, a fundamental research question is why people endorse some political
beliefs and reject others. A related question is why some individuals accept one interpretation of
political events and other individuals accept an alternative interpretation. Answering these
questions requires understanding how political reasoning works. In keeping with an influential
perspective in cognitive science (Marr & Poggio, 1976), political reasoning (like any other
psychological process) can be explored at three different levels of analysis: (i) a computational
level, probing the underlying functional principles and asking what the logic or function of
political reasoning is; (ii) an algorithmic level, investigating the fine‐grained representations
and dynamics that realise political reasoning; and (iii) an implementation level, focusing on its
physical underpinnings (e.g., neuronal activity). Here we investigate political reasoning by
focusing on the computational level of analysis. In psychology and neuroscience, the pre-
dominant computational perspective proposes that the brain realises Bayesian inference (Knill
& Pouget, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). According to this view, prior beliefs (built from
previous experience) are integrated with novel experience to obtain inference. This approach
implicates a key role for a motivation to be accurate, in other words a drive to afford estimates
which are as close as possible to reality. Applying Bayesian inference to political reasoning, the
theory predicts that individuals will embrace interpretations considered to offer the most
accurate description of society and politics (Bullock, 2009; Gerber & Green, 1999; Grynaviski,
2006). However, when assessing this prediction empirically, evidence suggests that an accuracy
motivation, and hence Bayesian inference, is insufficient to explain political thinking. For
example, individuals are more prone to endorse beliefs about society which support their own
interest or the interest of their own group (e.g., socioeconomic group, ethnic group, gender
group, etc.), even when these beliefs fit poorly with reality (Bartels, 2008; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993;
Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Also, stereotype and prejudice often appear to be driven
by convenience rather than by an attempt to describe reality accurately (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999;
Pettigrew & Marteens, 1995).
To address this puzzling empirical evidence, influential contemporary theories (Jost &
Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2016)
highlight the notion of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), which, following early philosophical
and psychological perspectives (for a review, see Jost & Banaji, 1994), views political beliefs as
arising from motivations beyond simple accuracy seeking. An influential account (the John Q,
Public model; Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2016) proposes that the
interaction of two modes of information processing, controlled and automatic, determines
which political belief will be endorsed. This model attributes a stronger influence to automatic
processes such as emotions and prior attitudes, and only a secondary influence to controlled
processes based on rational considerations of available evidence. Therefore, in most
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circumstances political beliefs would emerge as the product of automatic forces, with deliber-
ation coming into play only afterwards in the form of post‐hoc rationalization. This perspective
highlights that individuals are blind to the automatic processes that determine their political
convictions: at a conscious level, they would believe that their reasoning describes accurately
available evidence. Another highly influential proposal explains support for a certain political
view as dependent on three distinct motivations (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost et al., 2009). The
first one (analogous to an accuracy motivation) is epistemic, corresponding to a drive for un-
derstanding how society works and to evaluate it. The second is an existential motivation,
leading individuals to endorse political beliefs perceived as better for managing social threats.
Finally, a relational motivation would drive people to hold political interpretations which allow
them to foster socialization and bonding, and to pursue the interest of their own group.
Contemporary theories of motivated political reasoning (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2016) offer highly valuable
insight. However, these models are not computational (i.e., they do not explore the underlying
logic or function of a psychological process (Marr & Poggio, 1976)). Hence, whether political
reasoning can be understood within a computational perspective remains to be established (we
have already seen that the notion of Bayesian inference seems to fail to do so). The goal of this
paper is to elaborate on previous theories of motivated political reasoning and develop a
computational model of political reasoning. We will see that this model still relies on Bayesian
principles, though not on Bayesian inference but on the notion of Bayesian decision (Rigoli,
2020); hence the model is referred to as Bayesian Decision Model of Political Reasoning
(BDMPR). In the next section, the basics of Bayesian modelling are overviewed for unfamiliar
readers. Then, the BDMPR is presented and applied to explain a variety of manifestations of
political thinking. The last session discusses the model with respect to a broader set of issues.
2 | BAYESIAN MODELLING
Before introducing the BDMPR, it is useful to briefly overview Bayesian modelling in cognitive
science (Bishop, 2006). The typical scenario involves an unknown variable that needs to be
guessed based on some information: imagine a person trying to estimate the price of a house
who can ask three friends an opinion on this price. In the person's mind, this problem can be
represented by four variables: the true price of the house (HP), the first friend's opinion on this
price (F1), the second friend's opinion (F2), and the third friend's opinion (F3). This scenario
can be described by adopting the formalism of Bayesian networks (Bishop, 2006), where each
variable is represented by a circle (Figure 1) (note that these are all interval variables,
conventionally represented by circles; categorical variables can also be implemented, conven-
tionally represented by boxes). Arrows describe probabilistic dependences among variables. In
this scenario, the house price is assumed to influence the friends' opinions (i.e., the arrow goes
from the former to the latter), and not vice versa. This reflects the fact that the friends' opinions
actually depend on the house price, and not vice versa. The friends' opinion variables, but not
the house price variable, are shaded in grey. This convention indicates that the friends' opinions
are directly known, whereas the true house price is not known (it is a latent variable), but it
needs to be estimated indirectly. How does this estimation work? The idea is that the person
adopts Bayesian statistics to integrate the friends' opinions plus her own prior guess about the
house price (e.g., the person's own initial guess might be £300000). This integration results in a
posterior estimate of the house price, corresponding to the final guess (formally, this is the
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conditional probability of the house price given knowledge of the opinions of the three friends:
P(HP|F1, F2, F3)). Importantly, in this framework, the person can attribute different reliability
to different sources of information (formally, the reliability is captured by precision parameters;
see Appendix). For example, the person might trust the first friend much more than the second.
This entails that, when estimating the house price, the first friend's opinion will count much
more than the second friend's opinion.
In short, Bayesian modelling offers a formal description of how latent variables can be
estimated based on new information (the friends' opinion) and prior information (the own
initial guess). These principles can be adopted to implement Bayesian inference, as in the
example described here. When one of the variables captures a utility value, the same principles
can be extended to implement Bayesian decision. Below, we explore how Bayesian decision can
be applied to political reasoning, introducing the BDMPR.
3 | THE BAYESIAN DECISION MODEL OF POLITICAL
REASONING (BDMPR)
The BDMPR is implemented by the Bayesian network represented in Figure 2 (a more formal
description is offered in the Appendix). This describes the beliefs a social agent entertains about
certain important variables of society and politics and about their relationships. The variables
included in the model are represented by boxes (for categorical variables) and circles (for
continuous variable). As above, arrows indicate probabilistic dependencies among variables.
The first variable in the model is Hypothesis (Hyp), representing a categorical variable reflecting
a set of mutually exclusive statements about society or politics. For example, one statement
might claim that social benefits to unemployed people produce laziness (an anti‐benefits
hypothesis), and the alternative statement that social benefits foster job seeking (a pro‐benefits
hypothesis). These statements may not be evaluative, but simply descriptive (i.e., they may not
imply any value judgement). Hyp plays a central role within the BDMPR, because the final
result of the model is arbitrating among the different hypotheses implemented by Hyp. The
second variable in the model is Prior Belief System (PBS). This represents a categorical variable
reflecting a set of more general alternative views on society and politics. For example, one view
F I GURE 1 Bayesian network representing the scenario where a house price is estimated based on
opinions from three friends. Its variables are: House Price (HP), first friend's opinion (F1), second friend's
opinion (F2), third friend's opinion (F3). Arrows indicate probabilistic causal relations from one variable to
another. Shaded variables are those considered to be observed
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might be that state intervention promotes economic growth, and the alternative view that state
intervention impairs growth (as for Hyp, no value judgement may be implicated). The variable
Hyp depends on PBS, as the arrow going from the latter to the former indicates. For example,
someone tending to view state intervention as promoting economic growth will also tend to
attribute higher likelihood to the pro‐benefits hypothesis.
In the model, both Hyp and PBS are treated as hidden (or latent) variables, as they cannot be
observed directly but need to be inferred indirectly. For example, one does not know for sure
whether state intervention promotes or impairs economy (PBS) nor whether social benefits
encourage laziness or job seeking (Hyp). In addition to these two hidden variables (Hyp and
PBS), the model includes variables that are observed, called Direct Evidence (DirE) and Indirect
Evidence (IndE). The former is believed to be the consequence of Hyp and reflects novel in-
formation directly relevant for the specific hypotheses under consideration (e.g., a magazine
article describing the impact of social benefits on employment). IndE is believed to be the
consequence of PBS and reflects information relevant for the latter variable (e.g., a magazine
article describing the impact of state intervention on economy), thus being also indirectly
relevant for Hyp. Both DirE and IndE are represented by continuous variables (in our example,
positive values for DirE correspond to evidence supporting the pro‐benefits hypothesis, and
positive values for IndE correspond to evidence supporting the hypothesis that state interven-
tion promotes economic growth). Importantly, each evidence variable (DirE and IndE) is
associated with a weight (formally, a precision parameter; see Appendix) which determines how
influential that evidence is during inference. So far, we have considered PBS, DirE and IndE as
single variables. However, a model might include multiple PBS variables. In addition, each PBS
might project to multiple IndE variables and Hyp might project to multiple DirE variables. In
these cases, each evidence variable could be associated with a specific weight (or precision)
parameter, implying that each source of evidence will be more or less persuasive than the other.
For example, one magazine might be considered as highly reliable, another magazine as
extremely biased, a friend as trustworthy, another friend as deceitful, etc.
F I GURE 2 Bayesian network representing the model. Its variables are: Prior Belief Systems (PBS),
Hypothesis (Hyp), Direct Evidence (DirE), Indirect Evidence (IndE), Hypothesis Decision (HDec), and
Expected Outcome (EOut). Categorical and continuous variables are represented by rectangles and circles,
respectively. Arrows indicate probabilistic causal relations from one variable to another. Shaded variables are
those considered to be observed at each inference step
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Finally, the BDMPR includes a Hypothesis Decision (HDec) variable and an Expected
Outcome (EOut) variable. HDec is categorical and indicates which hypothesis of the variable
Hyp is accepted as true and is used to guide behaviour. For example, HDec may include the
following two categories: (i) accept the pro‐benefits hypothesis (and support parties favouring
social benefits) and (ii) accept the anti‐benefits hypothesis (and support parties against social
benefits). EOut reflects the expected outcome of this decision and depends on both Hyp and
HDec. EOut is represented by a continuous variable where negative values correspond to
punishment and positive values to reward. For example, EOut describes the outcome expected
to occur (i) if the pro‐benefits hypothesis is true and I accept it (and support parties favouring
social benefits), (ii) if the anti‐benefits hypothesis is true and I accept it (and support parties
against social benefits), (iii) if the pro‐benefits hypothesis is false but I accept it (and support
parties favouring social benefits) (iv) if the anti‐benefits hypothesis is false but I accept it (and
support parties against social benefits).
The BDMPR realizes Bayesian decision by following a sequence of steps and eventually
deciding which hypothesis to accept. Specifically, the model infers the consequences (in terms
of reward or punishment EOut) of accepting different hypotheses considering evidence from
DirE and IndE. Eventually, the hypothesis associated with the best consequence is accepted.
More formally, this inference and decision process works as follows. DirE and IndE are
observed and inference follows multiple steps. At each step, one different category of HDec is
considered as observed and the posterior probability of EOut given DirE, IndE and HDec (i.e.,
P(EOut|DirE, IndE, HDec)) is calculated. This is repeated for all possible categories of HDec.
After inference, decision follows, whereby the category of HDec associated with the best EOut
(i.e., the highest posterior utility value) is chosen.
It is important to highlight that, in the BDMPR, the selected hypothesis is not necessarily the
best supported by evidence (i.e., the one that maximizes accuracy), but the one associated with
the best consequences (i.e., the one that maximizes utility). This emphasis on utility maximi-
zation distinguishes Bayesian decision theory from standard Bayesian inference. For example,
the model predicts that an individual will be more likely to endorse the pro‐benefits hypothesis
if acceptance of this hypothesis is perceived as more advantageous compared to its rejection.
Based on this reasoning, unemployed people are predicted to be more likely to endorse the pro‐
benefits hypothesis, because accepting, compared to rejecting, this hypothesis entails higher
advantage for them. However, note that accuracy is still fundamental in the BDMPR. This is
because accepting a hypothesis which is poorly supported by prior beliefs (PBS) and by evidence
(DirE and IndE) is scarcely rewarding, implying that such hypothesis will be discarded.
According to the BDMPR, what is the phenomenological implication of accepting one
hypothesis over the other? We propose that the implication is that, phenomenologically, an
agent will believe that the accepted hypothesis is true even if, as explained above, it does
not necessarily enjoy more support from evidence. In other words, the BDMPR postulates
that agents are blind to the inference/decision process described above; they simply perceive
the accepted hypothesis as true, without being aware that their perception is the product of
utility maximization. This can explain the emergence of motivated political reasoning
(Kunda, 1990).
In short, the BDMPR explains the genesis of political beliefs by relying on a Bayesian
decision framework. The choice of such framework is motivated by the fact that such frame-
work is computational and yet it can account for motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). It
proposes that individuals consider prior belief systems together with novel evidence to infer the
consequences of accepting alternative hypotheses, eventually endorsing the hypothesis
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associated with the highest utility. This inference/decision process is postulated to be sub-
conscious, and to ultimately result in the perception that the accepted hypothesis is true at the
phenomenological level. This framework can help understanding the computations underlying
some forms of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Crucially, in this view, motivated reasoning
is not interpreted as being truly biased (i.e., something which violates computational princi-
ples), but only as apparently biased (given that ultimately it arises from the computational
principle of utility maximization). Below, we will examine the role of each element of the model
in the genesis of political thinking.
3.1 | The role of prior beliefs
By implementing the variable PBS, the BDMPR assumes that prior beliefs are critical in
determining which political interpretation will be endorsed (Figure 3). Different forms of prior
knowledge can be implemented in the model. First, prior beliefs can reflect knowledge about
more general aspects. In the example above, while Hyp describes beliefs about a specific aspect
of state intervention (i.e., regarding unemployment benefits), PBS captures beliefs about a more
general influence of state intervention (i.e., regarding economic growth). Second, prior beliefs
can reflect knowledge about a different, but partially related, context. For example, knowledge
about the impact of maternity benefits can inform assessment of the impact of unemployment
benefits. Third, prior beliefs can reflect accumulated experience at the personal level which is
generalised to the whole society. For example, knowing how unemployment benefits impacted
on the behaviour of a friend can inform assessment for the whole society.
We propose that prior beliefs in the BDMPR can explain contextual priming effects
occurring during political thinking (Berger et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2011; Kalmoe &
Gross, 2016; Todorov, 2005). In contextual priming experiments, participants are asked to
report political judgements after being presented with apparently irrelevant information (a
contextual prime). Strikingly, evidence has shown that this information, although apparently
irrelevant, can bias political judgements (Berger et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2011; Kalmoe &
Gross, 2016; Todorov et al., 2005). For example, after exposure to the American flag (a
contextual prime), individuals are more likely to support the conservative party (Carter
et al., 2011; Kalmoe & Gross, 2016). The BDMPR can account for these priming effects
thanks to PBS and IndE. The latter captures evidence which, despite not being directly
relevant for the hypotheses under consideration (Hyp), is directly relevant for PBS (Figure 4).
According to the BDMPR, because Hyp and IndE both depend on PBS, information encoded
by IndE will eventually exert an indirect influence over Hyp (Figure 4). As an example,
consider a model where (i) PBS describes a general liberal versus conservative ideology, (ii)
Hyp describes more specific beliefs about society (for example about the economy) which
depend on the general ideology, (iii) IndE registers presence or absence of the American flag,
and (iv) presence of the flag is treated as evidence supporting the conservative ideology. In
line with empirical evidence (Carter et al., 2011; Kalmoe & Gross, 2016), when the American
flag is shown the model predicts that beliefs about economy (implemented by Hyp) will be
biased towards conservativism. This occurs because of the indirect influence of IndE upon
Hyp via PBS.
In short, the BDMPR assumes that prior knowledge is critical in affecting which political
belief will be endorsed. Also, the model highlights the role of evidence which is not directly
relevant for the hypotheses under consideration, but which depends on prior beliefs. This
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evidence is predicted to exert an indirect influence, a process that might underly some forms of
contextual priming effects observed empirically (Berger et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2011; Kalmoe
& Gross, 2016; Todorov, 2005).
3.2 | The role of direct evidence
Despite its emphasis on motivated reasoning, the BDMPR still views available evidence as
highly relevant for political judgements. This notion is captured by the variable DirE (Figure 5),
which describes evidence directly relevant for the hypotheses under considerations (Hyp). As an
example, a magazine article discussing the impact of unemployment benefits will be considered
as directly relevant for establishing whether benefits encourage laziness or job seeking. An
important aspect is that the BDMPR associates a weight (or precision parameter) to the source
of information (Figure 5). For example, if the article appears on a magazine perceived as poorly
reliable (e.g., a magazine usually supporting a different ideology), it will be less influential on
the final judgement. The notion of weight or precision becomes particularly relevant when a
model includes multiple DirE variables, each associated with its own weight. This allows the
BDMPR to capture the idea that different sources are imbued with different degrees of
reliability. For example, a magazine generally supporting the own ideology will be attributed
more weight (and thus will exert higher influence) compared to a magazine generally
supporting a different ideology.
F I GURE 3 Description of the role of PBS. The simulated scenario is discussed also in the main text, where
Hyp includes two categories (Pro‐benefits hypothesis vs Anti‐benefits hypothesis), PBS includes two categories
(Grow vs NoGrow, reflecting whether state intervention promotes economic growth or not, respectively),
positive values of DirE support the Pro‐benefits hypothesis, and positive values of IndE supports the Grow
category for PBS. The x axis reflects the prior probability for PBS = Grow. Different lines indicate different
values for DirE. For all lines, IndE = 0, the precision parameter for DirE λSenE2 ¼ 0:005, the outcome of accepting
the Pro‐benefits hypothesis when it is true (μEOut|Pro;ProAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits
hypothesis when it is false (μEOut|Anti;ProAcc) is equal to 0, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐Benefits hypothesis when it
is true (μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis when it is false
(μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is equal to 0. The y axis reflects the posterior outcome value of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis
minus the posterior outcome value of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis
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The role of available evidence DirE proposed by the BDMPR can explain empirical data on
the influence of contextual ideological information (Cohen, 2003). One experiment presented
participants with political statements usually associated with either right‐ or left‐wing ideology
(Cohen, 2003). Not surprisingly, left‐wing participants tended to endorse left‐wing statements,
and right‐wing participants right‐wing statements. However, in one condition, while par-
ticipants were presented with a statement, they were also informed about whether the
conservative or the democratic party supported the statement. Strikingly, in this condition
left‐wing participants tended to endorse right‐wing statements believed to be supported by
the democratic party, and right‐wing participants tended to endorse left‐wing statements
believed to be supported by the conservative party. In the context of the BDMPR, these
findings can be understood by focusing on the role of DirE. The statement can be repre-
sented by Hyp (where categories indicate whether the statement is true or false), and
whether the statement is supported by the conservative or democratic party can be repre-
sented by DirE. In other words, a participant could treat information about which party
supports the statement as evidence relevant to establish whether the statement is true or
not. For example, a left‐wing participant would consider support of the democratic party as
evidence that the statement is true. In this way, the BDMPR can explain empirical data
showing that political judgements are highly dependent on contextual ideological informa-
tion (Cohen, 2003).
F I GURE 4 Description of the role of IndE. The simulated scenario is discussed also in the main text,
where Hyp includes two categories (Pro‐benefits hypothesis vs Anti‐benefits hypothesis), PBS includes two
categories (Grow vs NoGrow, reflecting whether state intervention promotes economic growth or not,
respectively), positive values of DirE support the Pro‐benefits hypothesis, and positive values of IndE supports
the Grow category for PBS. The x axis reflects the value of IndE. Different lines indicate different values for
precision parameter for IndE λIndE2. For all lines, P(PBS = Grow) = 0.5, DirE = 0, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐
benefits hypothesis when it is true (μEOut|Pro;ProAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis
when it is false (μEOut|Anti;ProAcc) is equal to 0, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐Benefits hypothesis when it is true
(μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis when it is false (μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is
equal to 0. The y axis reflects the posterior outcome value of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis minus the posterior
outcome value of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis
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In short, despite an emphasis on motivated reasoning, in the BDMPR political judgements
are still highly influenced by available evidence, as captured by DirE. The degree of influence
exerted by evidence can vary for different sources, according to a weight or precision parameter.
The role of direct evidence DirE in the BDMPR can potentially explain empirical findings
indicating an influence of contextual ideological information (Cohen, 2003).
3.3 | The role of utility
The aspects examined so far (prior beliefs and evidence) are captured also by Bayesian inference
(Knill & Pouget, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). The key aspect distinguishing the latter from
Bayesian decision is the inclusion of a utility component. In the BDMPR, acceptance and
rejection of any hypothesis is linked with an expected utility (Figure 6). Consider the example
above comparing a pro‐benefits versus anti‐benefits hypothesis. Here the model asks: what is
the consequence of accepting the hypothesis that benefits produce laziness (hence supporting
anti‐benefits parties) if the hypothesis is true? And if it is false? And what is the consequence of
accepting the hypothesis that benefits promote job seeking (hence supporting pro‐benefits
parties) if the hypothesis is true? And if it is false? From the answers to these questions (and
from considering how probable each hypothesis is), the model establishes whether, overall,
accepting the pro‐benefits hypothesis will be better (in terms of expected utility) than accepting
F I GURE 5 Description of the role of DirE. The simulated scenario is discussed also in the main text,
where Hyp includes two categories (Pro‐benefits hypothesis vs Anti‐benefits hypothesis), PBS includes two
categories (Grow vs NoGrow, reflecting whether state intervention promotes economic growth or not,
respectively), positive values of DirE support the Pro‐benefits hypothesis, and positive values of IndE supports
the Grow category for PBS. The x axis reflects the value of DirE. Different lines indicate different values for
precision parameter for DirE λDirE2. For all lines, P(PBS = Grow) = 0.5, IndE = 0, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐
benefits hypothesis when it is true (μEOut|Pro;ProAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis
when it is false (μEOut|Anti;ProAcc) is equal to 0, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐Benefits hypothesis when it is true
(μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis when it is false (μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is
equal to 0. The y axis reflects the posterior outcome value of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis minus the posterior
outcome value of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis
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the anti‐benefits hypothesis, or vice versa. The best hypothesis will then be accepted, and
believed to be true at the phenomenological level.
An important aspect of this reasoning is that, according to the BDMPR, the accepted
hypothesis will not necessarily be the one which is wished to be true, but rather the one
considered to be more costly to reject. To understand this point, consider a conservative indi-
vidual (i.e., someone valuing tradition as highly positive) arbitrating between the hypothesis
that immigration is disrupting tradition against the hypothesis that immigration is not affecting
tradition. For the individual, the hypothesiswished to be truewill obviously be that immigration is
not affecting tradition. However, which hypothesis is more costly to reject? The answer is that
rejecting the hypothesis that immigration is disrupting tradition (implying no need to oppose
immigration) will be more costly to reject. In this example, the model predicts that the individual
will tend to accept the hypothesis that immigration is disrupting tradition (the one more costly to
reject, not the one wished to be true). Notably, this prediction is specific to the BDMPR, whereas
most previousmodels of political motivated reasoning and ideology claim that hypotheses wished
to be true (and not hypotheses more costly to reject) are more attractive.
Another important aspect regards the definition of utility adopted by the BDMPR. Scholars
often conceive utility as subjective, implying that individuals will evaluate different outcomes in
their own peculiar way (Fishburn, 1970). This idea is also shared by the BDMPR. Many also
interpret utility in terms of purely material and economic wealth (Fishburn, 1970). This
approach is not followed by the BDMPR, where utility is viewed as encompassing multiple
F I GURE 6 Description of the role of EOut. The simulated scenario is discussed also in the main text,
where Hyp includes two categories (Pro‐benefits hypothesis vs Anti‐benefits hypothesis), PBS includes two
categories (Grow vs NoGrow, reflecting whether state intervention promotes economic growth or not,
respectively), positive values of DirE support the Pro‐benefits hypothesis, and positive values of IndE supports
the Grow category for PBS. The x axis reflects the difference between the expected outcome of accepting the
Pro‐benefits hypothesis when it is true (μEOut|Pro;ProAcc) and the expected outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits
hypothesis when it is false (μEOut|Anti;ProAcc). Different lines indicate different values for DirE. For all lines, P
(PBS = Grow) = 0.5, the precision parameter for DirE λDirE2 ¼ 0:0012, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits
hypothesis when it is true (μEOut|Pro;ProAcc) is equal to 20, the outcome of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis when it is
false (μEOut|Anti;ProAcc) is equal to 10, the outcome of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis when it is true
(μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc) is equal to 10. The y axis reflects the posterior outcome value of accepting the Pro‐benefits hypothesis
minus the posterior outcome value of accepting the Anti‐benefits hypothesis
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forms of evaluation. With this regard, research has highlighted a set of core values which are
qualitatively different, and which emerge in many different cultures (though different cultures
will emphasise one or the other core value) (Schwartz, 1992). This perspective is relevant for the
BDMPR, where utility may be conceived as an integration of multiple core values (with their
relative weight varying across cultures and individuals). The reason for adopting this
perspective on utility here is that a main argument ensuing from the BDMPR is that political
reasoning is not purely “epistemic”, but it is affected by one's own motivational values; what
type of values one embraces is tangential to this argument.
Inclusion of a utility component allows the BDMPR to account for a set of empirical data.
Substantial evidence shows that political beliefs depend on self‐interest and on the interest of the
own group (Bartels, 2008; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). The
BDMPR proposes that this occurs because the hypothesis which promotes interests will be more
costly to reject. Also, empirical evidence suggests that induction of death anxiety elicits ideo-
logical radicalization (i.e., liberals “become” more liberal and conservatives more conservative)
(Castano et al., 2011; Kosloff et al., 2010). The BDMPR can explain this by proposing that
experiencing psychological distress (such as death anxiety) will produce a change in the utility
mapping. In other words, the proposal is that distress will magnify the distance in utility for
rejecting/accepting different hypotheses. Consequently, the relative cost of rejecting the most
appealing hypothesis will be even larger. In line with empirical evidence (Castano et al., 2011;
Kosloff et al., 2010), this predicts that, in a state of death anxiety, the ideology previously
accepted will be supported even more strongly. Note that this argument not only applies to death
anxiety, but to any form of distress, something which remains to be investigated empirically.
It is worth noting that empirical literature has identified a more complex link between
anxiety and ideology. Research has found a connection between higher trait anxiety and con-
servative ideology (Jost et al., 2003, 2007). In the context of the BDMPR, we suggest that this
link is not dependent on the utility component, but on prior beliefs (implemented in PBS).
Consider the belief (implemented in Hyp) that the economy is grounded on fierce competition,
supported by the view (implemented in PBS) that humans are fundamentally egoistic and
aggressive. These ideas are characteristic of many conservative ideologies. Viewing humans as
egoistic and aggressive is likely to have implications not only for the political, but also for the
personal, sphere. For example, it will increase the expectation of malignity in interpersonal
relations. In turn, these expectations will be conducive of anxiety. In short, we suggest that the
same prior belief that humans are egoistic and aggressive will support both conservativism in
the political sphere and anxiety‐inducing expectations in the personal sphere, hence explaining
the empirical link between conservativism and high trait anxiety (Jost et al., 2003, 2007).
To summarise, our Bayesian decision proposal differs from Bayesian inference because of
the inclusion of a utility component capturing forms of motivated political reasoning. This
component can explain a tendency to endorse political beliefs which support self and group
interests at the expense of accuracy. Also, the notion of utility offers an interpretation of why
death anxiety increases radicalisation. The BDMPR predicts a similar effect is exerted by any
form of distress, a prediction which remains to be tested empirically.
3.4 | Stereotype, displaced aggression, and anti‐interest beliefs
Above, we have focused on specific elements of the BDMPR. Here we adopt a different
approach and examine the model in the context of important phenomena in political
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psychology. First, we focus on stereotyping (Bar‐Tal et al., 2013). A stereotype is a belief about a
social group which is retained despite contrary evidence. Stereotypes have been associated with
prejudice (corresponding to a negative evaluation of the social group) and discrimination
(Bar‐Tal et al., 2013). To understand how the BDMPR explains stereotypes, consider the
example of owners of land and of black slaves in 19th Century Southern USA. A common
stereotype among these individuals was that black people were genetically different, for
example more impulsive, less intelligent, and more violent. On this basis, slavery was viewed as
ultimately beneficial for black people too, as it offered slaves a benevolent and paternalistic
master. In the context of the BDMPR, we can treat this stereotype as corresponding to a hy-
pothesis implemented by Hyp. The alternative hypothesis would be that black and white people
are equal, implying that slavery is not beneficial for black people. Why did many landowners
endorse the stereotype? The BDMPR proposes three factors at play. First, prior beliefs (PBS)
might have been influential. For example, the belief that human races are genetically different
in terms of psychological traits, and the belief that human society needs to be organized in
hierarchies, were prior beliefs which supported the stereotype. Second, certain conditions were
interpreted as evidence (DirE) supporting the stereotype hypothesis. For example, behaviour of
poorly educated, maltreated and despised black slaves often resulted in impulsiveness, poor
intelligence, and violence. These were interpreted as genetic predispositions, although in fact
they were the very consequence of slavery (which paradoxically was proposed as the solution).
A third aspect of the BDMPR which can explain stereotyping is the role of expected costs and
benefits. In other words, at a subconscious level a landowner might have asked: what is the
consequence of rejecting the stereotype hypothesis if it is true? And if it is false? And of rejecting
the alternative hypothesis if it is true? And if it is false? Overall, rejecting the stereotype
hypothesis might have appeared as much more costly, because it entailed criticising an
advantageous social and economic system.
Displaced aggression (Dollard et al., 1939; Marcus‐Newhall et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2003) in
social and political contexts is another process that can be fruitfully interpreted by the BDMPR.
Consider Germany right before Hitler took power. Because of the dramatic economic crisis
exploded few years earlier, many people were experiencing the hardship of being jobless. We
can imagine that people were seeking an explanation for their unemployment. Adopting the
BDMPR, we speculate that two alternative explanations were available (implemented in Hyp).
The first one is a systemic hypothesis, viewing the cyclic nature of capitalistic economy as
responsible. The second hypothesis relies upon Jews' avarice in financial speculation. History
tells us that many embraced the latter hypothesis, unleashing Hitler's unprecedented aggression
towards Jews. Why did so many believe in Jewish guilt? Like with stereotyping, the BDMPR
addresses this question by highlighting the role of prior beliefs. The idea of race as being
genetically determined, and of races constantly fighting against each other, were prior beliefs
which supported the anti‐Jews hypothesis. Moreover, the BDMPR proposes a role for expected
costs and benefits. At a subconscious level people might have asked: what is the consequence of
accepting the anti‐Jews hypothesis (and attacking Jews) if it is true? And if it is false? And of
accepting the systemic hypothesis (and reforming capitalism) if it is true? And if it is false? Let
us try to imagine how these questions were answered by many people. What is the consequence
of accepting the anti‐Jews hypothesis (and attacking Jews) if it is true? Many people might have
answered that the consequence was highly positive. This is because Jews were a weak minority,
and hence attacking Jews was predicted to be successful. Consider now the third question: what
is the consequence of accepting the systemic hypothesis (and reforming capitalism) if it is true?
Many people might have answered that the consequence was not very positive. This is because
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reforming capitalism might have appeared as highly unlikely. Assuming an equal cost for
wrongly accepting any of the two hypotheses, the BDMPR implicates that the anti‐Jews
hypothesis was more appealing. In other words, the BDMPR proposes that the anti‐Jews
hypothesis was more appealing because Jews were perceived as an easy target, while reforming
capitalism was perceived as unlikely. Based on this cost/benefit reasoning, the anti‐Jews
hypothesis might have been eventually accepted despite being less supported by evidence (we
note empirical data consistent with this interpretation; Berkowitz, 1959). This offers an example
of how the BDMPR explains displaced aggression (Dollard et al., 1939; Marcus‐Newhall
et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2003) in social and political contexts, where initial suffering results in
blaming a weak minority based on poor arguments, and in attacking the minority. Notably, the
picture offered by the BDMRP is analogous to previous social psychology accounts such as the
scapegoat theory of prejudice (Veltfort & Lee, 1943).
For a theory of political thinking based on motivated reasoning, it is critical to explain why
individuals sometimes endorse beliefs which appear as going against their own and group
interest. For example, why do many working class people vote conservative? Why do many
people from disadvantaged ethnic minorities share stereotypes against their own ethnic group?
Why do many females endorse sexist beliefs? When disadvantaged social groups (workers,
ethnic minorities, females) endorse beliefs apparently going against their interest, we can talk
about anti‐interest beliefs. To examine how the BDMPR explains anti‐interest beliefs, first it is
important to emphasise that the beliefs described by the model are subjective. Therefore, some
cases of anti‐interest beliefs might simply be explained by failure to recognize certain
hypotheses as less advantageous. For example, some working‐class members might simply
believe that cutting taxes for riches (a policy often supported by the conservative party) will not
affect the welfare services they are relying upon. Or some religious peasants might have
believed that revolting against a king blessed by God was going to lead to land reform but also to
divine damnation.
However, there are circumstances where individuals are supposedly aware that a hypothesis
is detrimental for them, and yet they accept it. For example, research has shown that many
black people endorse racial stereotypes (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Katz & Braly, 1935; Sagar &
Schofield, 1980) such as that black people are more violent. They are supposedly aware that this
belief is detrimental for their interest, but they still endorse it. Why? The BDMPR proposes that
this emerges because evidence (implemented by DirE) is interpreted as supporting the stereo-
type, counteracting any utility loss implicit in it. We can identify three aspects explaining why
this occurs. A first critical aspect concerns how hypotheses are framed. For example, one in-
dividual might consider the hypothesis “black people are more violent” versus “black people are
less violent”. In this frame, evidence of black people's violence will be interpreted as supporting
the first hypothesis. A second person might contemplate more nuanced hypotheses such as
“violence depends on race” versus “violence depends on education and social status”. Since
education and social status are now considered, evidence of black people's violence will rarely
support the first hypothesis (given that black people tend to be less educated and have lower
social status; Jussim et al., 1987). Eventually, the first and second person will endorse and reject
the stereotype, respectively. This raises the question of why hypotheses are framed the way they
are in a society. This question goes beyond the scope of the paper, but socialization and power
dynamics are likely to be critical. This implies that the dominant groups will have a primary
role in shaping the categories used for political reasoning in a society (Gramsci, 1971; Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Marx & Engels, 1846/1968).
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A second aspect explaining why, in the context of the BDMPR, evidence is interpreted as
supporting the stereotype (even when this goes against own and group interest) relies on the
notion of self‐fulfilling prophecy (Jussim et al., 1996). The latter consists in disregarding the fact
that an event does not occur spontaneously, but it results from the very belief that the event
occurs spontaneously. For example, the stereotype above might sometimes derive from not
realising that black people's violence is in fact the very consequence of viewing black people as
more violent. A third aspect is about the sources of information in a society. Our beliefs rely on
evidence coming from two sources: from our own senses, and from other people or media. In
large and complex societies, senses count less and the role of media is overwhelming. Media
tend to be controlled by dominant groups, simply because these have larger economic and
cultural resources. This implies that, on average, these media will be more likely to disseminate
(even subtle) stereotypes against weaker groups than stereotypes against dominant groups
(Mastro, 2009). In addition, media controlled by dominant groups will have more resources at
their disposal, and hence better access to information. Therefore, their messages will be usually
considered as more reliable (and will be weighted more during belief formation) also by
disadvantaged groups. For these reasons, media will often expose a disadvantaged group to
stereotypes that, despite being against the group's interest, are still treated as reliable by the
group. In short, the BDMPR explains anti‐interest beliefs by highlighting three factors (all
linked with the role of evidence (DirE)): the way hypotheses are constructed, self‐fulfilling
prophecies, and the role of media.
To summarise, this section applies the BDMPR to a set of important phenomena in political
psychology, including stereotype, displaced aggression, and anti‐interest beliefs. This perspec-
tive offers new insight to further understand these phenomena. In addition, the model offers a
unifying explanation of domains often viewed as separate, highlighting the common processes
at play. Importantly, this is realised by reliance on the basic principles of Bayesian decision
theory. We argue that a promising avenue for future research is to attempt applying this
framework also to other phenomena in political psychology.
4 | DISCUSSION
This paper introduces the BDMPR, a theory of political thinking which extends the notion of
Bayesian inference to the notion of Bayesian decision. While Bayesian inference models
(Bullock, 2009; Gerber & Green, 1999; Grynaviskyi, 2006) struggle to explain motivated political
reasoning, the latter is a critical element emerging from the BDMPR. By shifting from Bayesian
inference to Bayesian decision, the theory views political reasoning as ultimately driven by utility,
rather than accuracy, maximization. This implies that the nature of political reasoning is
fundamentally pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals) and not epistemic (i.e., seeking
understanding). Critically, this implies that individuals are blind to the true motivations driving
their beliefs. At the phenomenological level, the model assumes that individuals will sincerely
believe that their conclusions are the best in light of evidence and prior knowledge. In otherwords,
the model assumes some degree of self‐deception. This assumption fits with the widely accepted
view of motivated reasoning as acting at a subconscious level (Kunda, 1990). But is this also
justifiable within a computational perspective (i.e., based on the general function and logic of a
psychological process)? The following answer to this question can be proposed (Trivers, 2011).
Within a computational perspective, political beliefs can be conceived as means to obtain social
goals. To be effective, political beliefs would need to satisfy three fundamental requisites. First,
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they would need to describe the social world accurately, an aspect the BDMPR captures by
attributing importance to evidence and prior beliefs (if these are ignored, social goals will not be
obtained). Second, they would need to take utility into account, also in line with the BDMPR.
Third, because humans are primarily social animals, political beliefs will need to persuade others.
Only if this occurs, political beliefs will ultimately be effective. In this perspective, self‐deception
might have evolved as an effective strategy to persuade others (a possibility which has received
empirical support; Smith et al., 2017; Schwardmann & Van der Weele, 2019).
In the BDMPR, utility does not capture only material and economic conditions, but any
form of value (the notion of core values could be useful to define utility in the context of the
BDMRI; Schwartz, 1992). In other words, the BDMPR is agnostic about the nature of motiva-
tions underlying utility (i.e., it does not make any prediction about what motives drive political
reasoning). With this regard, it has been suggested that epistemic, existential, and relational
motives play a primary role in determining ideological convictions (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost
et al., 2009). This view is compatible with the BDMPR, though the model fits also with the
possibility that other motives (for example, purely material desires) are influential. Some
scholars have proposed the existence of a specific motivation for justifying the current society
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2019). Substantial evidence shows that individuals often believe
that aspects of the current society are just, even if this goes against their interest (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2019). However, whether this evidence reflects a specific motivation
remains controversial (Jost et al., 2019; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2009). The BDMPR is compatible
with the possibility of a specific motivation for justifying the current society. However, it also
raises an alternative explanation: the belief that the current society is just might be a form of
anti‐interest beliefs (described above), which do not require any specific motivation for system
justification. Note finally that the BDMPR can describe conditions where political reasoning is
driven exclusively by accuracy seeking. These conditions occur when the cost of rejection/
acceptance is equal across all hypotheses under considerations.
By adopting a computational approach (namely focusing on the function and logic of a
psychological process) the BDMPR concerns a specific level of analysis. This approach is
complemental to theories focusing on the algorithmic level, namely examining the fine‐grained
psychological processes at play (e.g., Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber &
Lodge, 2016). Some algorithmic models of political reasoning rely on the useful distinction
between automatic and deliberative processes (Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber &
Lodge, 2016). The former are considered to be fast, rigid, and subconscious, the latter to be slow,
flexible, and conscious. The BDMPR is suitable to describe automatic processes. However, the
model can be extended to characterise also slower and more flexible processes acting at a
subconscious level. This fits with the general idea that Bayesian accounts can be used to
describe psychological processes at multiple levels, from perception to social cognition (Knill &
Pouget, 2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007).
The BDMPR operates at an abstract level (in Marr's terminology, at a computational level),
and hence it offers a certain flexibility regarding how it can be fitted to specific problems. This
flexibility characterises social science models operating at an abstract level, including Bayesian
inference (Bullock, 2009; Gerber & Green, 1999; Grynaviskyi, 2006) and two‐process models
(Kim et al., 2010; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2016). Nevertheless, this does not imply
that abstract models have no constrains and can explain every empirical phenomenon. For
example, here we have argued that Bayesian inference models (Bullock, 2009; Gerber &
Green, 1999; Grynaviskyi, 2006), despite their flexibility, are poorly equipped to explain moti-
vated reasoning. Similar constrains apply to the BDMPR: for example, as described above, the
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BDMPR proposes that hypotheses more costly to reject (and not hypotheses wished to be true)
are more attractive. This prediction is specific to the BDMPR, whereas most previous models of
political motivated reasoning and ideology claim that hypotheses wished to be true (and not
hypotheses more costly to reject) are more attractive.
The paper focuses on psychological processes and not on the social dynamics that shape
political reasoning. An important future research goal is to embed the BDMPR within a more
general framework where political reasoning is shaped by social processes and in turn acts upon
these social processes.
The BDMPR aims at offering a general theory of political reasoning, potentially valid in all
contexts. General theories make necessary simplifications, and some instances might fit with
the theory only poorly. However, their advantage is that they can offer insight on common
principles underlying apparently different phenomena. The BDMPR relies on a mathematical
modelling approach, which is relatively novel in the study of political reasoning. This approach
implies some reductionism because it requires disregarding some subtle aspects of the concepts
studied. However, it also offers a formal description of the processes involved, facilitating
theoretical debate and formulation of empirical predictions. For this reason, mathematical
modelling is becoming more and more popular in cognitive psychology and neuroscience;
exploring its potentials in the context of political reasoning can potentially bridge research in
cognitive psychology/neuroscience and research on social/political behaviour.
To summarise, the paper describes a novel theory which reconciles computational principles
(specifically, the notion of Bayesian decision) with the concept of motivated political reasoning.
We argue that the theory can inspire future research in at least two ways. First, the model can
be used to interpret important phenomena in political psychology, and here we offer examples
regarding stereotype, displaced aggression, and anti‐interest beliefs. Second, by relying on a
mathematical formulation, the model can be adopted to identify specific predications that can
guide empirical investigation.
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APPENDIX
Formally, the BDMPR is a mixture of Gaussians. The joint probability can be written as:
P(PBS, Hyp, HDec, EOut, DirE, IndE) = P(PBS) P(HDec) P(Hyp|PBS) P(IndE|PBS) P(DirE|
Hyp) P (EOut|Hyp, HDec)
PBS is a categorical variable with number of categories equal to nPBS and where each
category is associated with a probability. If we consider the example about the influence of
unemployment benefits (see above), we can set nPBS=2, PBS = Grow if state intervention
promotes economic growth, and PBS = NoGrow if state intervention impairs growth. The
probability of promotion is P(PBS = Grow) = x and the probability of impairment is
P(PBS = NoGrow) = 1 − x (where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1). Hyp is also categorical, with number of categories
equal to nHyp. Considering the same example, we can set nHyp = 2, Hyp = Pro for the pro‐benefit
hypothesis (i.e., benefits encourage job seeking), and Hyp = Anti for the anti‐benefits hypothesis
(i.e., if benefits encourage laziness). The conditional probabilities for Hyp are P(Hyp = Pro |
PBS = Grow) = y, P(Hyp = Anti | PBS = Grow) = 1 – y, P(Hyp = Pro | PBS = NoGrow) = z,
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P(Hyp = Anti | PBS = NoGrow) = 1 – z (where 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ z ≤ 1). HDec is also categorical,
with the number of categories nHDec = nHyp. In our example, HDec = ProAcc when the pro‐
benefits hypothesis is accepted (or, equivalently, when the anti‐benefits hypothesise is rejected)
and HDec = AntiAcc when the anti‐benefits hypothesis is accepted (or, equivalently, when the
pro‐benefits hypothesis is rejected). Probabilities for HDec are P(HDec = ProAcc) = u and
P(HDec = AntiAcc) = 1 ‐ u (where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1).
DirE is a Gaussian variable conditioned on Hyp. Its conditional probability can be defined
as:






Here, every category of Hyp k has its own associated average μDirE|k; for instance, the model
will include μDirE|Pro (conditional on the pro‐benefits hypothesis) which is different from
μDirE|Anti (conditional on the anti‐benefits hypothesis). The parameter λDirE
2 reflects the weight
or precision of DirE and in the BDMPR it is equal for all levels of Hyp (in principle, a specific
weight for each level of Hyp can be implemented). A similar logic applies to IndE with respect
to PBS. The conditional probability is now:






Also for IndE every category of PBS i has its own associated average μIndE|i; for instance, the
model will include μIndE|Grow (conditional on the hypothesis that state intervention promotes
economic growth) which is different from μIndE|NoGrow (conditional on the hypothesis that state
intervention impairs economic growth). The parameter λIndE2 reflects the weight or precision of
IndE and in the BDMPR is equal for all levels of PBS (in principle, a specific weight for each
level of PBS can be implemented).
Finally, EOut is a Gaussian variable conditioned on both Hyp and HDec. Its conditional
probability is:






This indicates a specific average for each combination of Hyp and HDec. For instance, the
model comprises μEOut|Pro;ProAcc (the expected outcome if the pro‐benefits hypothesis is true and
it is correctly accepted), μEOut|Pro;AntiAcc (the expected outcome if the pro‐benefits hypothesis is
true but it is wrongly rejected), μEOut|Anti;AntiAcc (the expected outcome if the anti‐benefits
hypothesis is true and it is correctly accepted), μEOut|Anti;ProAcc (the expected outcome if the
anti‐benefits hypothesis is true but it is wrongly rejected). The parameter σ2Eout reflects the
uncertainty about the outcome and in our model it is equal for all combinations of Hyp
and HDec (although in principle one can also implement a specific parameter for each
combination).
The model is used to make inference. For inference, the variables DirE and IndE are
observed, while the other variables are not. This includes multiple inference steps. At each step,
for each level of HDec j, the model infers the conditional probability of EOut given the observed
values for DirE and IndE and given HDec = j. This corresponds to the posterior Gaussian
distribution:
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Where μEOut|DirE;IndE;j is the posterior average for the expected outcome. For example,
μEOut|DirE;IndE;ProAcc will be the posterior average if the pro‐benefits hypothesis is accepted, and
μEOut|DirE;IndE;AntiAcc is the posterior average if the anti‐benefits hypothesis is accepted.
After all these inferences are made, the model makes a decision by choosing the hypothesis
associated with the highest posterior μEOut|DirE;IndE;j. For instance, it will either choose to accept
the pro‐benefits or the anti‐benefits hypothesis.
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